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Gem State Rooﬁng Incorporated (“Gem State”), by and through its
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Ritter

PLLC,

respectfully ﬁles this Appellant’s

Reply Brief in

support of its appeal 0f the District Court’s September 17, 2019 Judgment and the related

December

2019 Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs.

13,

I.

In

its

answering

brief,

INTRODUCTION

Defendant/Respondent United Components, Incorporated (“UCI”)

has simply repeated the erroneous ﬁndings of the District Court, without providing this Court

any legal basis

t0 support those ﬁndings.

arguments raised by

Gem State,

0r

UCI has made n0

show that

effort t0 either refute the legal

the cited case law

is

inapplicable.

Gem State here

responds to UCI’S repetitions 0f the District Court’s erroneous conclusions, and for the reasons
set forth here

and

in

Gem State’s opening brief, this Court should apply the law t0 reverse the

District Court’s decision.

II.ARGUMENT
A.

In

Gem State Showed that the District Court Erred in Denying Gem State Relief.
its

opening

brief,

State’s appeal, which, in

-

Gem

State established the factual

summary,

is

and procedural basis for

Gem

as follows:

Starting in 1995, Jeff and Michelle

Flynn began rooﬁng services in Ada County

under the corporate name “Flynn, Inc.”
-

“Gem

State

In 1997, Rick Silvia

Rooﬁng.”

began rooﬁng services

in Blaine

County under the name

-

In 1998, Flynn, Inc.’s

Maintenance, Inc.” (referred to in
-

In 2002,

this appeal as

Gem State-Boise

sparked a trademark dispute between
-

name was changed

“Gem

expanded

t0

“Gem

State

Rooﬁng

& Asphalt

State-Boise”).

its

operations into Blaine County, Which

Gem State and Gem State-Boise.

In October 2005, before any litigation

was ﬁled between them,

Gem State

and

Gem State-Boise executed the Trademark Settlement Agreement (referred t0 herein as the
“TSA”), pursuant

Which

t0

(i)

Gem

confusingly similar t0 each other;
similar services;

(iii)

State

(ii)

and

Gem State-Boise agreed that their names

Gem State

and

Gem State-Boise agreed that they provide

Gem State and Gem State-Boise agreed that there was a likelihood 0f

confusion as t0 source, origin, and sponsorship of their respective services;

agreed that
agreed

it

it

would not

advertise or solicit business in Blaine County; (V)

would not perform any

here); (Vi)

are

Gem State-Boise

services in Blaine

agreed that

from performing under the TSA,

it

if it

would

County (with

(iv)

Gem State-Boise

Gem State-Boise

certain exceptions not relevant

received a request for

work that

it

was prohibited

direct the person or entity requesting the

work

t0

Gem

State.

-

Starting in 2010,

in Blaine County, in Violation

-

carried

0n

letterhead,

In 201

1,

Gem State-Boise began bidding 0n jobs

and performing work

0f the TSA.

Jeff Flynn dissolved Gem-State Boise and created Defendant

Gem State-Boise’s business without interruption, using Gem State-Boise’s
phone number, and customers. Most importantly, UCI continued

Boise’s trade name,

“Gem

State

Rooﬁng.”

t0 use

UCI. UCI

equipment,

Gem State-

-

through

at least

-

UCI

name “Gem

State

Rooﬁng”

2018, in Violation 0f the TSA.
Neither

State, as required

-

continued t0 work in Blaine County under the

Gem State-Boise nor UCI ever referred any Blaine County work to Gem

by the TSA.

Gem State-Boise and UCI’S

solicitation

and performance 0f rooﬁng jobs

Blaine County, along With the failure t0 refer such jobs to

Gem State,

caused

in

Gem State t0 lose

proﬁts.

Gem State

-

On July 20,

2018,

-

The

immediately commenced written discovery, though

parties

very few documents in response t0
-

In

ﬁled the Complaint Which initiated

this action.

UCI produced

Gem State’s written discovery requests.

November and December 2018,

Gem State

served eleven

(1 1) third-party

subpoenas duces tecum upon some 0f Defendant’s potential and existing customers in Blaine
County. In response, those third parties produced hundreds of pages of documents, including

numerous emails and contracts

that

had not been produced by UCI, even though UCI had been a

party t0 those emails and contracts.
-

On January 28,

2019,

Gem State ﬁled a Motion to Compel on January 28,

-

On February 6,

2019,

Gem State ﬁled a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

-

On March 4,

served, and several

on the Motion

to

weeks

2019, some six months after the

after the

Motion

t0

Compel was

initial

2019.

discovery requests were

ﬁled, but just days before the hearing

Compel, UCI produced 1,031 pages 0f documents, most 0f Which related

t0 the

— a job worth some $300,000

large animal shelter project

pages

it

had produced prior
-

On April

UCI — compared t0

the total 0f

1

18

Gem State’s ﬁling 0f its Motion t0 Compel.

t0

3,

to

2019, the District Court granted

Gem State’s Motion t0 Compel, but

“deferred ruling 0n an award 0f costs and attorney fees.”
-

On April 26,

the Parties’ cross-motions for

State-Boise;

(ii)

the

TSA is

2019, the Court entered

its

Memorandum Decision and Order 0n

summary judgment, ﬁnding

enforceable against UCI; and

that

(iii)

(i)

UCI

is

a successor t0

UCI breached the

Gem

Settlement

Agreement.
-

State’s

that

Motion

Thereafter,

t0

UCI

admitted

the records that

it

Agreement,

its

Gem

instead stated

.

.

.

emails.”

had deleted responsive emails: “UCI did not maintain 0r keep many of

were provided through subpoena, and UCI does not have a method 0f recovery
documents

that could

be recovered have

now been produced

...”

Gem State ﬁled a Motion for Sanctions, based 0n UCI’S refusal t0 turn over any

email communications.

UCI’S (and

Order granting

electronic record keeping system in place t0 maintain

for deleted electronic ﬁles. A11

-

District Court’s

Compel — UCI did not produce any additional documents, and

“UCI does not have an

Further,

UCI refused to comply with the

Gem State asked the Court (i) “t0 take it as established that, but for

predecessor

Gem State-Boise’s) Violation 0f the Trademark Settlement

Gem State-Blaine would have obtained the Blaine County jobs that UCI and Gem

State-Boise obtained,” and

the discovery dispute.

(ii)

for an

award 0f costs and attorneys’ fees

Gem State incurred 0n

-

On June 24,

2019, the District Court granted

Gem State’s Motion for Sanctions,

but refused to order the relief Gem State requested. Instead, the District Court required
turn over

party (at

all

of its computers and other electronic devices and access to email accounts to a third

Gem State’s cost),

State’s cost) t0

and further authorized

Gem State to issue subpoenas

(also at

Gem

UCI’S third-party Email Service Providers.
-

apparently

UCI to

Gem State did hire a third party t0

UCI had,

access and produce

in fact, deleted responsive emails.

UCI’S email providers

Gem State

all

0f UCI’S emails, but

also issued subpoenas t0

(AOL and Google), but those providers refused t0 produce responsive

information. R., pp. 000767-772.
-

A one-day Court trial was held 0n August 5, 2019.

-

On

September

Conclusions 0f Law and
-

0n the grounds

On

that

its

was

2019, the District Court issued

Findings 0f Fact

its

&

Judgment, Which are the subj ect of this appeal.

September
it

17,

19,

2019,

UCI moved

for an

award 0f attorneys’

fees

and

costs,

the prevailing party, notwithstanding the District Court’s ﬁnding that

neither party prevailed.

-

costs based

granting

On

September 24, 2019,

Gem State moved for an award of attorneys’

0n the entry 0f the Order granting

fees

and

Gem State’s Motion t0 Compel and the Order

Gem State’s Motion for Sanctions.
-

On December

and Costs, denying the

13,

2019, the District Court entered

Parties’ cross

its

motions for attorneys’ fees and

Order Re: Attorney Fees

costs.

The

and the law 0n which

District Court’s errors,

Gem State urges this

Court to ﬁnd

those errors reversible, are, in summary, as follows:
-

more

The

Court failed

District

likely than not suffered

District

damage

Court focused on the fact that

The

District

answer the question: “did

Inc.

v.

TSA?”

Instead, the

Gem State could not prove the precise amount 0f damages,
that to

mean

that

Gem State was not entitled to damages

Court could have avoided error by following

Alphonsus Diversified Care,

Gem State prove that it

as a result 0f UCI’S breach 0f the

and then, working backward, interpreted
at all.

t0

this

Court’s decision in Saint

MRIAssocs., LLP, 334 P.3d 780 (Idaho 2014):

The measure of damages

for loss of proﬁts

is

rarely susceptible of

accurate proof. Therefore, the law does not require accurate proof

with any degree 0f mathematical certainty. Any claim of damages
for prospective loss contains an element of uncertainty, but that

The most elementary conceptions 0f
justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer shall bear the
risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created. The party
fact is not fatal t0 recovery.

seeking to recover lost proﬁts

is

not required to obtain the

testimony of the customers allegedly lost as a result of the
wrongdoer's conduct. There only need be sufﬁcient evidence in the
record to allow the jury to conclude that the inference linking the
wrongdoer's conduct to the claimant's damages is more probable

than the inference connecting such loss t0 other factors. Factors
that the jury

may consider include the

claimant's proﬁts for a

reasonable period prior to the breach of the covenant not to

compete, leaving

it

for the other party t0

show

that,

by depression

in trade 0r other causes, they would have been less, the relationship
between the increase in proﬁts by the party breaching the covenant
and the losses sustained by the claimant during the period of the
breach, and all 0f the surrounding facts and circumstances.

334 P.3d

at

790 (internal

citations

State With that uncertainty,

The

The

omitted).

District

Court focused 0n

amount of damages (Which uncertainty was created by UCI), charged

the uncertainty in the

-

and quotations marks

District

and refused

Court found

to order injunctive relief or

Gem

money damages.

Gem State’s evidence insufﬁcient t0

support a ﬁnding that

Gem State would have gotten the jobs that UCI bid on and performed, but the District Court
failed to adequately consider

UCI’S obligation under the

work t0”

requesting the [Blaine County]

County work and not

referring the

work

Gem State.
t0

TSA t0

“direct the person 0r entity

UCI’S double-breach — bidding 0n Blaine

Gem State-Blaine — makes it even more difﬁcult t0

Gem State-Blaine was damaged: Gem State-Blaine was not even learning

determine Whether

about the jobs and never had an opportunity to bid them. That uncertainty — would
Blaine have been able t0 secure
not against

work

it

never

knew was

out there?

uncertainty created

decision, the

more

its

by UCI’S breach

that

n0 cost

difﬁcult

for

-

its

The

it

UCI,

as

erroneous, opposite conclusion, the District Court allowed the

UCI

t0 serve as a shield t0

UCI. Under the

can confuse customers into thinking

it is

Gem State is t0 learn about a job and get an opportunity t0 bid 0n
more

against

Gem State, because UCI created the uncertainty by not referring the work,

required. In reaching

the

— must be held

Gem State-

will be for

Gem State to prove losses

it;

District Court’s

Gem State, the less likely
and the more

that happens,

and the more likely UCI Will be

to

pay

duplicitous behavior.

District Court also penalized

Gem State for failing t0 produce the testimony 0f

customers allegedly lost as a result 0f Defendant’s wrongful conduct, contrary t0
statement that “The party seeking t0 recover lost proﬁts

is

this

Court’s

not required t0 obtain the testimony 0f

the customers allegedly lost as a result 0f the wrongdoer's conduct.” SaintAlphonsus,

334 P.3d

at

790.

-

The

Of course,

District

Court seemed to ﬁnd that the injury-causing behavior had resolved

itself.

not enjoining or otherwise penalizing UCI’S contract—breaching behavior Virtually

assures that UCI’S contract-breaching activity will continue: if UCI can conduct business in

TSA, and pay no penalty

Violation 0f the

with discovery rules — there

warned against

this

is

for the Violation

n0 reason

for

UCI to

abide

— even avoid the

cost of complying

by the TSA. This Court has expressly

outcome:

beware of efforts t0 defeat injunctive
relief by protestations of repentance [sic] and reform, especially
when abandonment seems timed t0 anticipate suit, and there is
It is

the duty of the courts to

probability 0f resumption.

O’Boskey

v.

First Fed. Sav.

-

Relatedly, the District Court found that

“minimal.” That ﬁnding
relief.

What the

& Loan ASS ’n ofBoise, 739 P.2d 301,

District

is

Court missed in

its

analysis

Gem State,

was

as the

that the very act

TSA required,

UCI worked were worth nearly $300,000.00

rooﬁng business

in Blaine County,

Whose gross revenue

more than “minimal.”

If indeed

UCI’S conduct

is

Mg, coupled

deprived

Gem State of the

District Court’s

in revenue.

in the years

2014 when UCI was breaching the TSA, never even reached $300,000
manifestly,

0f

work — 0f the opportunity t0 earn proﬁts. Even by the

erroneous count, the jobs
for a small

UCI’S contract-breaching behavior was

both factually wrong and irrelevant t0 the standard for injunctive

with UCI’S refusal t0 refer work to
opportunity to get the

306 (Idaho 1987).

That amount,

2010 through

in a single year

is,

both minimal and self—remedied, as

the District Court believes, the entry of injunctive relief prayed for

more than enforce

the terms of the

— which would d0 nothing

TSA anyway — would have worked n0 hardship

0n UCI.

Moreover, the District Court’s decision had the effect 0f nullifying the TSA, which the District
Court did not have authority to d0.

By effectively

“recent,” the District Court interpreted the

in time,

it is

no breach
-

The

at all

— which

is

excusing UCI’S conduct as “minimal” and not

TSA t0 mean that if a breach is

something that the

District Court’s refusal t0

award

based largely 0n the District Court’s ﬁxation 0n

TSA does not say.

Gem State damages appears t0 have been

Gem State’s relative proﬁt margin — a fact that is

completely irrelevant t0 the question of 10st proﬁts. The error here
Legally, the question

on damages concerns Whether

proﬁt margin. Proﬁt margin

is

simply n0 proxy for

utterly unrelated t0 proﬁt margin.

The

that

Gem State

is

both legal and factual.

lost proﬁts,

lost proﬁt. Indeed, total

not whether

proﬁts

it

lost

may be

Gem State was losing proﬁts,

due in part

to

Gem State was cutting costs t0

stay alive.

Those

fact that

UCI’S contract-breaching conduct, meant

“minimal,” or remote

cost-cutting measures increased margin, even as total proﬁts

— Which

is

the legal measure of its

damages — declined.
-

The

District Court should

State’s trademark claim in the

entering into the

TSA, by Which

State’s trademark.

(9th Cir. 1986).

mark

See

have found

UCI

estopped from challenging

Gem

GEM STATE ROOFING, based 0n Gem State-Boise’s

Gem State-Boise

MWS Wire Indus., Inc.

v.

expressly recognized the legitimacy of Gem

California Fine Wire C0., 797 F.2d 799, 800—04

-

The

District

Court should have awarded

incurred in connection 0n the Motion t0

Gem State its attorneys’

Compel and the Motion

were granted by the Court. Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure

award 0f fees and

costs,

and the

District

fees

for Sanctions, both

and costs

0f Which

37(a)(5), 37(b)(2)(C) require an

Court never found any rules—based grounds for not

awarding them.
-

The sanctions

UCI

the District Court levied against

for

its

discovery abuses were

manifestly deﬁcient. The District Court ultimately authorized

Gem State t0 conduct Wide-

ranging discovery, including third-party discovery, but forced

Gem State t0 d0

and on practically the eve of trial. Those sanctions bore n0
the cost

was

prohibitive.

The

District

fruit

its

own

Court should have followed the guidance provided by In re

the relatively light, and certainly inexpensive, sanction

QLD.

and imposed

Cal. 2006)

Gem State asked for:

that

“when

Gem State-Blaine’s

damages

is

more probable than

State-Blaine’s loss t0 other factors.” That requested sanction

t0 apply,

fair

it

comes

Gem State-Blaine’s total damages as a result 0f UCI’S breach 0f

the Settlement Agreement, the Court can and should conclude that the inference linking

conduct t0

cost

because there was no time and

Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation, 462 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1077-78

time for the Court to ascertain

so at

would not have wasted

time,

the inference connecting

would have been easy

would not have wasted

resources, and

UCI’s

Gem

for the Court

would have been a

response t0 UCI’S repeated and ﬂagrant ﬂaunting of its discovery obligations.
B.

UCI’s Arguments D0 Not Support Afﬁrming the

UCI’S arguments 0n appeal are

legally unsupportable.

-10-

District Court’s Decision.

Gem State responds

as follows:

1.

UCI

On Injunctive Relief:

argues that

Gem

State

is

present any evidence regarding UCI’S proﬁts and corresponding losses.
13.

This argument misapprehends the law regarding injunctive

proﬁt or the loss thereof that can remedied by

be granted only

if the injured

Jur.

2d Injunctions

party against

whom relief is

this standard

Respondent’s Brief at

Which

is

not focused 0n

remedy

at law.

.

.

.

Thus,

offer substantial redress, an injunction Will be denied.”

sought

v.

”

Statefailed t0

“Generally, injunctive relief Will

N0, the standard for entry 0f injunctive

§ 26.

seeking the remedy.” Conley

found that

money damages:

relief,

party lacks a complete and adequate

where the payment of money can

“Gem

not entitled t0 injunctive reliefbecause

is

relief is a

Violating, or threatens to Violate,

Whittlesey,

showing

some

the

TSA.

that “the

0f the party

right

985 P.2d 1127, 1135 (Idaho 1999). The

was met: UCI had repeatedly breached

42 Am.

District

Court

Injunctive relief should

have been granted. Moreover, the Court’s (erroneous) ﬁnding that damages were unproven 0r
too speculative should have weighed in favor of awarding injunctive relief:

breach

is clear,

more than enforce

jobs subject

a contract

but damages are not, payment of money cannot offer substantial redress and

injunctive relief is appropriate, particularly here,

Next,

When

the terms 0f the

Where the prayed-for injunction would d0 n0

TSA.

Gem State argues that “In over 14 years arom 2005-2019), UCI worked 0n

t0 the

TSA.

.

.

.

Further, none 0fthese instances caused

State.” Respondent’s Brief at 14. This

argument

is

disingenuous

harm 0r damage

at best:

Gem State-Boise worked on four (4) jobs in Violation of the TSA (R.,
starting in 2010, not 2005. Also,

UCI and Gem

UCI

at pp.

0r

its

t0

three

Gem

predecessor

000629-630),

State-Boise bid on at least four (4) other jobs
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(that

were disclosed

Neither

to

Gem

Which

in discovery),

State-Boise nor

UCI

ever referred any of those eight (8) jobs

Gem State, which is also a distinct Violation 0f the TSA.

beginning in about 2010,
the

TSA”

(R., at p.

View the discovery

TSA.

are separate Violations of the

Gem State-Boise,

63 1), and violated
rules as binding

it

0n

and

at Will.

it,

UCI

know what

cannot

1. It is

“did not believe

Moreover, because

Gem State

— about one per year —

R., at pp. 629, 63

UCI thereafter,

00063 1.

R., at p.

it

clear that,

was bound by

also did not

other jobs

seem

t0

UCI might

have bid 0r worked on in Violation of the TSA.
Next,
that

UCI argues that “[T]he

UCI was working in Blaine

During

litigation,

violate

Gem

UCI was
’

States rights.

elements ofRule 65(e)(3) were [not] met simply by thefact

County. The rule callsfor a timeframe 0f ‘during litigation.

not working 0n projects in Blaine County that would threaten 0r

The only ongoingjob was the animal Shelter

being lost.” Respondent’s Brief at 14-15. This argument
the disjunctive

District

—

if

is

any 0f the subparts are met, injunctive

in

which money was

nonsensical. First, Rule 65(6)

relief is appropriate, so that

in

is

even

if the

Court found that subpart 3 was not met (the District Court did not make that ﬁnding),

subparts (1) 0r (2) could support injunctive

appropriate

when

“the defendant

is

relief.

Moreover, subpart

(3)

makes

TSA did not bind it is
by

a tacit “threatening” t0 act contrary t0

the very terms 0f UCI’S argument,

“ongoing” during the

litigation,

injunctive relief

doing, threatening, procuring or allowing to be done, or

about t0 d0, some act in Violation 0f plaintiff’s rights.” The very fact that

Finally,

’

it,

which was a Violation of the TSA; the

allegedly suffering a loss does not excuse UCI’S Violation of the

-12-

UCI believed that the

in Violation

UCI’s work 0n the animal

TSA.

is

0f Gem State’s

shelter proj ect

fact that

rights.

was

UCI was

UCI next argues

that

“Gem

Statedfailed ...because

it

continue t0 d0 business in Blaine County, nor that the business
violated the TSA.” Respondent’s Brief at 16.

belief that the

As

UCI would

could not establish that

set forth in the

UCI was doing in

Blaine County

preceding paragraph, UCI’S

TSA did not apply to it constituted a threat that UCI would continue to work in

Blaine County, contrary to the TSA. Furthermore, UCI’S argument starkly demonstrates the

problem with the

District Court’s ﬁnding:

of the TSA, there

is

no disincentive

to

because

work there — the

injunctive 0r monetary relief means that, for

The foregoing notwithstanding,

was doing
t0

in Blaine

UCI has

all

though, because there

is

TSA

practical purposes, the

its

w

Violation

bind UCI.

the District Court unequivocally found that the business

County did Violate the TSA: “the Court ﬁnds

were not exceptions

for

District Court’s refusal t0 grant

Gem State Boise) breached the TSA by performing services

that

no penalty

suffered

set forth in the

TSA.”

R., at p.

that

.

.

.

UCI

(as the successor

for customers in Blaine

000635. That express ﬁnding

no enforcement of the TSA. The

District

UCI

Court should,

at

a

is

County
hollow,

minimum,

have entered an injunction against UCI’S continued breach.
Finally,

UCI

argues that

“Gem

UCI in Blaine County caused any
In

making

this

argument,

State could notprove that the workpreviously

injury, let

alone irreparable injury.” Respondent’s Brief at

UCI demands more

than the laws does.

“injunctions should issue only where irreparable injury

P.2d

at

306 (emphasis added). As

for breaching the

set forth in the

TSA, UCI has no reason

done by

is

As

this

t0 stop breaching

have temporarily ceased operations there (and there

-13-

is

Court has explained:

actually threatened.”

preceding paragraph,

it.

if

UCI

is

0 ’Boskey,

suffers

Even assuming

n0 proof that

16.

that

the case):

739

n0 penalty

UCI may

beware of efforts t0 defeat injunctive
relief by protestations of repentence [sic] and reform, especially
When abandonment seems timed t0 anticipate suit, and there is
It is

the duty of the courts to

probability of resumption.

Id.,

739 P.2d

at

306.

Reputational

harm

is

generally recognized as irreparable and not compensable Via

money

damages:
[I]n

many

situations, irreparable

harm can be demonstrated by

pointing t0 the fact that the trademark owner's business goodwill

and reputation are

in peril. If it is likely that confused persons Will

mistakenly attribute t0 plaintiff defects 0r negative impressions
they have of defendant's goods or services, then the plaintiff‘s
reputation

is at risk.

This threatened loss 0f reputation and good

Will cannot adequately
after the

harm has

be compensated for in dollars and cents

occurred.

Even though defendant may have the resources t0 be able t0
pay damages after a trial, the difﬁculties of proof 0f compensatory
damages where a good name and reputation are at risk can usually
mean that “irreparable damage” is accruing.
5

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition

§ 30:47.50 (5th ed.).

At

trial,

presented evidence ofjust this kind of reputational harm:

Q. Do you have an opinion about the quality of the work that the
defendant did in Blaine County and how that quality may have
affected your business reputation?

A. Well, take the dog shelter for instance. Right after
this fall,

it

was done

they were back this spring replacing shingles that

fell

off

I got a phone call from up there. And their quality is not
good. That's one of the reasons we're here t0 have them mixing

the roof.

With mine.
Q. Are you familiar with other jobs other than the dog shelter in
which the quality was substandard?
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Gem State

Howard job. Because when we redo roofs, we unloosen the
Okay? We get a lot of snow up there. So we unloosen the

A. The
siding.

Okay? And then
we put ice and water shield going from the roof up the wall under
the siding and then new metal ﬂashings. They didn't do that. That's
the leak that we ﬁxed over there. So the few jobs that they'd gone
up there, Imean, I even get calls t0 ﬁx them.
siding and take

Q.

You believe

you

the existing metal out 0f there.

that the defendant's

work

in Blaine

County caused

t0 lose proﬁts?

A. Yes,
Q.

all

Is

I

d0.

there anything else you'd like t0

tell

court as t0

why you

believe that, sir?

town and people talk. That's the way
Idaho is. You know, When another company comes into town that's
only 3,000 people 0r whatever, as Gem State Rooﬁng, a company
that's been established there for 20 years, people start talking, you
know. It's just -- that's just the way it is.
A. Yes.

Trial Tr., p. 131, L.

It's

20 —

just a very small

p. 132, L. 15; p. 133, L. 12-22.

Losses due t0 reputational damages

be long-lasting and even

fatal.

Those

quantify, particularly Where, as here,

may not be

immediately apparent, but the effects

may

losses, as this case demonstrates, are often difﬁcult to

Gem State was not even learning about what jobs UCI was

misappropriating and s0 had n0 opportunity t0 bid 0n those proj ects. (R., at p. 000386).

2.

First,

clients that

On Damages:

Gem State

wanted

t0

argues (not for the only time), that “all the projects were customers 0r

d0 work speciﬁcally with UCI because ofprevious work 0r existing

professional relationships.” Respondent’s Brief at 17. That

As argued

above, UCI’S contract breaches included
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(i)

is

not true, and not legally relevant.

doing work in Blaine County,

(ii)

bidding

on jobs, and

(iii)

not referring Blaine County

work t0

tied to persons With preexisting relationships With

relationships

do not exculpate UCI, because the

for “repeat

County

Court found: “UCI

County

that

.

.

.

breached the

were not exceptions

Next,

UCI

UCI and
sets

is

listed in [the

TSA.”

not being appealed by

R., at p.

Respondent’s Brief at 17-18.

many records

the

000635. That ﬁnding has not

that the conduct

was not minimally
’

This

is

not the proﬁt offhejobs that would be realized.”

Gem State has never argued that UCI’S work in Blaine County

resulted in $300,000.00 proﬁt.

not produce

TSA. As

for customers in Blaine

breaching because the three violating contracts are worth a net $300,000.
is

R., at

Gem State.

up a straw man: “Gem State urged

misrepresented. Obviously $300,000

TSA].”

not listed in the

TSA by performing services

set forth in the

all

TSA only allowed UCI to work in Blaine

UCI worked for in Blaine County were

District

Those breaches were not

UCI. Moreover, alleged preexisting

customer business for the former customers

000024. The customers

been appealed by

Gem State.

Of course, UCI never produced

at all. In

any event, UCI’S proﬁt

is

evidence about

its

proﬁt —

0f marginal relevance.

it

did

Gem State’s

proof was that UCI’s contract-breaching work and bids amounted t0 jobs worth a gross $481,554
(R., at p.

000688). Multiplied by

have resulted

been

in

$220,166.49 0f proﬁt, had

hired. Id.; Trial.

UCI

Gem State’s average proﬁt margin 0f 45.72%, those jobs would
UCI referred those jobs

Gem State and Gem State

Exh. 104a.

argues, incorrectly, that

“Gem

State did notpresent any proﬁt loss, likely because

suﬁ’ered n0 real loss 0r damage. Proﬁt margins were all that

Respondent’s Brief at

to

19.

Gem

State did

show

was presented by Gem

State.”

losses, including sustained losses during the
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it

when

period in and after 2010

Gem

records show). See Trial Exh. 104a. Additionally,

Silvia, that

to

Gem State lost proﬁt.

Tr., p. 131, L.

proﬁt margin was used precisely as

0f losses. See Prehn
“Source
P.3d

and

at

its

Luzar

1's

v.

this

20 —

that the expert witness “used the

sums

Nora

v.

Safeco

Ins. C0.,

testimony, Via Mr.

trial

it:

to calculate the

that the district court

it

SaintAlphonsus, 334

actually received

by

Plaintiff]

Pope

v.

would have

[the

Defendant]

received”). See also

Intermountain Gas C0., 646 P.2d

it

would have been given

what

its

bid

the contract, 0r

would have been awarded any 0fthe three projects

Respondent’s Brief at 20.

used

1's lost profits”);

State t0 task for “not submitﬂing] evidence regarding

anything else t0 support aﬁnding that

w

577 P.2d 347, 350 (Idaho 1978).

price would be, testimonyfrom the Clients stating

UCI undertook.

UCI’S produced

Gem State’s evidence related

Hodge, 385 P.3d 876, 885 (Idaho 2016) (noting

UCI then takes Gem

not exist.

p. 132, L. 22.

W. Sur. C0., 692 P.2d 337, 342 (Idaho 1984);

988, 1005 (1982);

(so far as

produced

Court has in the past used

proﬁt margin t0 calculate the proﬁts that [the

v.

State

proﬁt margin for 201 1” t0 “calculate[] Source

789 (noting

began

the contract-breaching activity

UCI here

asks

that

Gem State to meet a burden that does

Gem State cannot say what its bid price would have been on proj ects it never learned

about, never evaluated, that are years 01d, and that

UCI

other than UCI’S

Gem State is not required to produce

own

testimony from clients

estimates 0r invoices. Also,

it

never

knew

about:

itself failed to

“The party seeking

produce documents about,

t0 recover lost proﬁts is not

required to obtain the testimony of the customers allegedly 10st as a result 0f the wrongdoer's

conduct.” Saint Alphonsus, 334 P.3d at 790.

UCI was

What Gem

doing work in Blaine County contrary t0 the
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State did present

was

(i)

evidence that

TSA — and the District Court agreed;

(ii)

evidence that
District

UCI was bidding 0n projects

Court agreed; and

(iii)

in Blaine County, contrary t0 the

failing t0 refer Blaine

the TSA.. R., at pp. 000631, 635. That evidence

is

County work

to

Gem

TSA — and the

State, in Violation

sufﬁcient to draw an inference that

would have obtained some 0f the work that UCI, working under the name “Gem

Gem State’s name,

had UCI not been using

and had

Gem State

State,” did

UCI referred the work to Gem

of

—

State as

required:

The most elementary conceptions ofjustice and public policy
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty
which his own wrong has created. The party seeking t0 recover
require that the

proﬁts

10st

not required t0 obtain the testimony of the customers

is

allegedly 10st as a result 0f the wrongdoer's conduct. There only

need be sufﬁcient evidence in the record t0 allow the jury t0
conclude that the inference linking the wrongdoer's conduct t0 the
claimant's damages is more probable than the inference connecting
such loss t0 other factors.
Saint Alphonsus, 334 P.3d at 790

UCI uses

a

non

sequitur

When

it

argues, “[zjhere

was evidence

UCI that established all offhe work at issue stemmedfrom UCI’S

in the record, setforth

by

existing client relationships.

Further, all 0fth0se existing clients specifically reached out t0 UCI, with n0 solicitation 0n the

part 0f UCI,

t0 perform the

legally incorrect; also,

suffered n0 damages.

relationships With

it

work. Respondent’s Brief at 22. Those statements are factually and

does not follow that

It is

not the case that

UCI — there was n0

preexisting customers. Moreover,
“soliciting” ignores the

(i)

all

UCI

did not Violate the

0f the work

at issue

TSA,

or

(ii)

Gem State

stemmed from preexisting

evidence that the contract-breaching bids were

UCI’S

efforts t0 avoid liability

under the guise that

TSA language that prevents performing “any services
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all t0

it

in Blaine

was not
County,

,9

except to speciﬁcally identiﬁed former customers, as well as advertising and soliciting in Blaine

County. R.,

p.

000628-29. Performing rooﬁng work for anyone not speciﬁcally

TSA. So does bidding on work. So does not

referring

“speciﬁcally reached out t0 UCI.” The District Court

p.

work to

Gem State when a customer

was not persuaded by UCI’S argument

000635), and that ruling has never been appealed by any party;

case.

More

listed violates the

it is

(R.,

and remains the law 0f the

importantly, UCI’S assertions are irrelevant t0 the question 0f whether

Gem State lost

proﬁt.

UCI relies 0n this

Court’s decision in Melaleuca

but that case does not provide the support

of its independent sales persons in an

UCI needs.

effort t0 reclaim

v.

Foeller,

318 P.3d 910 (Idaho 2014),

In Melaleuca, the

company was suing one

commission payments the company had

paid t0 the sales person While the sales person was in breach 0f its contract.

Id., at

923.

The

Court found that the company was required to prove damages in order t0 recover those
commissions.

Id. at

924 (UCI

relies

0n Martsch

1055 (Ct.App.1985) for the same principle).

v.

Gem

Nelson, 109 Idaho 95, 100, 705 P.2d 1050,
State takes

no issue With

agrees that a plaintiff must prove damages in order t0 recover damages.

that

Melaleuca does not refute —

is

that evaluating

this:

Gem State

Gem State’s argument —

damages from a non-competition agreement

proceeds in a speciﬁc order:

1.

First the

Court must determine Whether the plaintiff suffered

established that during the relevant period

the

TSA, through the time 0f trial —

from what they had been prior

— 2010, When

10st proﬁts.

Gem State-Boise

ﬁrst

Gem State

began Violating

Gem State’s revenue and proﬁt were substantially depressed

t0 that period, just after the
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TSA was

signed. See Tr. EXh. 104a.

2.

Then, the Court must determine Whether those lost proﬁts are more likely due to the

contract-breaching behavior than t0 other causes:

There only need be sufﬁcient evidence in the record to allow the
jury t0 conclude that the inference linking the wrongdoer’s
conduct t0 the claimant’s damages is more probable than the
inference connecting such loss t0 other factors. Factors that the
jury

may consider include

the claimant’s proﬁts for a reasonable

period prior to the breach 0f the covenant not to compete, leaving

show that, by depression in trade 0r other
would have been less, the relationship between the
increase in proﬁts by the party breaching the covenant and the
losses sustained by the claimant during the period of the breach,
for the other party t0

it

causes, they

and

0f the surrounding

all

and circumstances.

facts

Saint Alphonsus 334 P.3d at 790 (emphasis added; internal citation and quotations omitted).

State

proved

showing

that

this

by showing a drop

UCI breached not

under the name
referring Blaine

“Gem

State

in

income during the UCI-contract—breaching period, by

only by working in Blaine County, but also by bidding 0n jobs

Rooﬁng,” and most importantly

County work

t0

Gem State,

as the

for this point, breaching

Blaine County jobs, and most importantly had

referred

recover from

— notably,

UCI

narrowly tailored

all

its

County, refrained from bidding on

work to

Gem State would have obtained at least some

causes at play

worked

it

Gem State, it is reasonable t0

of that work. While there were other

the great recession 0f the late 2000’s

—

Gem State has never sought to

0f Gem State’s business losses during that time;

rather,

claims t0 the speciﬁc items 0f contract breach: the jobs

0n, and sought only

by not

TSA required. Had UCI complied With its

TSA obligations — had UCI refrained from working in Blaine

believe that

Gem

Gem State has
UCI bid 0n and

Gem State’s normal proﬁt margin from those jobs.
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R., at p.

000688.

Under

the standards 0f this Court, that

is

sufﬁcient to prove the fact that lost proﬁts were due to

UCI’S contract breaches.
3.

The

last step in the

process

the determination 0f amount of lost proﬁts:

is

The measure of damages

for loss 0f proﬁts is rarely susceptible of

accurate proof. Therefore, the law does not require accurate

proof with anV degree 0f mathematical certainty. Anv claim 0f
damages for prospective loss contains an element 0f
uncertaintv, but that fact is not fatal t0 recoverv. The most
elementary conceptions ofjustice and public policy require that the
wrongdoer shall bear the risk of the uncertainty Which his own

wrong has

created.

Saint Alphonsus 334 P.3d at 790 (emphasis added; internal citation and quotations omitted).

“The mere
that

fact that

it is

difﬁcult to arrive at an exact

damages may not be awarded;

Drilling, Inc.

v.

it is

amount of damages

for the trier-of—fact t0

Am. Drilling Corp, LLC, N0.

ﬁx

does not

mean

the amount.” Timberline

CV O9-18—N—EJL-MHW, 2010 WL

11531293,

*7 (D. Idaho Mar. 17, 2010) (internal citations omitted). Once the Court has determined steps

and 2 —

that the Plaintiff did suffer losses,

other causes,

it is

up the Court

t0

ﬁx

and more

likely

the amount, even

when the evidence of amount

“Reasonable certainty” does not require mathematical exactitude,
fact that

damages, where
that

it is

it is

difﬁcult to arrive at exact

shown that damages

damages may not be awarded;

the amount. In ﬁxing that amount,

it is

it is

amount of

mean
trier-of—fact to ﬁx

resulted, does not

for the

for the trier of fact t0

determine the credibility of the witnesses, to resolve conﬂicts in
the evidence, and t0

draw reasonable inferences therefrom
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1

from the contract breach than from

but only that the damages be taken out 0f the realm 0f speculation.

The mere

at

is

uncertain:

Bumgarner v. Bumgamer, 862 P.2d 321, 332 (Idaho
The

District

App. 1993)

(internal Citations omitted).

Court did not go through the analysis in step one and two, and instead focused 0n

Gem State

the uncertainty in step 3 and penalized

3.

for

it.

On Trademark:

In response t0

learned

Ct.

Gem State’s trademark claim, UCI argues “Gem State asserts that itﬁrst

ofGSRAM in Blaine

County

in

2002 but

evidence ofwhen UCIﬁrst actually used

its

Gem

not conclusive 0r even compelling

this is

State

Rooﬁng mark in Blaine

Gem

Gem

County, as

Stateﬁrst became aware, not

State asserts. The

2002 year

evidence ofwhen

GSRAM started using the mark.” Respondent’s Brief at 28-29. Of course, that

is

is

simply a statement ofwhen

and utterly meaningless.

true

Gem State produced evidence that it ﬁrst began using the

GEM STATE ROOFING word mark in Blaine County in
cannot, present evidence 0f use of that

present any such evidence at
cites to its

that

it

in

t0

and

best,

UCI

asserted, without supporting evidence,

that design

mark

registration

came seven

Gem State began operating under the name GEM STATE ROOFING in Blaine

County, and there
it

not,

any such evidence 0n appeal. At

Which UCI

had been using the mark since 1985; however,

UCI has

County prior t0 1997 — UCI did not

in Blaine

and has not cited

trial

2004 design mark application

(7) years after

mark,

mark

1997. Trial Exh. 2.

is

no evidence

in the record that, regardless

of when

UCI began using the

did so in Blaine County prior t0 1997.

Trademark
Dynamics,

Inc.

v.

Armstrong C0.

v.

rights in the

United States are acquired by use, not by registration. Hydro-

George Putnam

& Ca,

811 F.2d 1470, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing

Nu-Enamel Corp, 305 U.S. 315, 334,
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(1938); United States

v.

Steﬁ’ens,

100

U.S. (10 Otto) 82, 92, 25 L.Ed. 550 (1879)). “It
test

0f ownership

invented the

mark

been the ﬁrst
Inc.

v.

is

priority

ﬁrst or even to have registered

Entm ’t

mark

the ﬁrst to use the

mark

Optimal Pets,

that area.

See also Halicki Films,

1526004,

at

user and

it

is

Commc ’ns,

Inc.

v.

LLC v.

and must continue

mark

Nutri-Vet,

Inc.

v.

LLC, 877

Sanderson Sales
v.

T0

owner 0f the mark has

in a particular area

F.

to so use the

RMC Int’l, Ltd.,

be

in

547 F.3d 1213, 1226 (9th

96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir.1996));

LLC, N0. 1:14-CV-00233-BLW, 2018

(common law trademark rights extend only t0

known and recognized). The

to

Supp. 2d 953, 958—59 (C.D. Cal. 2012).

& Marketing,

TimberStone Mgmt.,

ﬁrst t0 use a

mark

an area

in

is

deemed

WL

the area

the “senior”

has the right t0 enj oin “junior” users from using confusingly similar marks in the

same industry and market within

that area. Broolg’ield

common law trademark owner must also

Commc ’ns,

Assocs., Inc.

v.

174 F.3d

at

establish continuing use 0f the mark,

maintained without interruption.” Optimal Pets, 877 F. Supp. 2d

v.

ownership must have

in a geographical area, the

*5 (D. Idaho Mar. 27, 2018)

Where a mark

ﬁrst; the party claiming

not enough t0 have

C0rp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir.1999) (emphasis added).

Cir.2008) (citing Sengoku Works Ltd.

Idaho GolfPartners,

it

it is

of goods or services.” Broolg‘ield

in the sale

common law trademark rights

establish

axiomatic in trademark law that the standard

0f use. T0 acquire ownership 0f a trademark

to actually use the

W. Coast

is

at

959

(citing

1047.

The

which “must be
Casual Corner

Casual Stores ofNevada, Ina, 493 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir.1974); Hanginout,

Google, Ina, 54 F. Supp. 3d 1109, 1121 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (trademark owner must establish

sufﬁcient market penetration in a speciﬁed geographic area).
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Inc.

At

trial

and trademark

Gem State
in Blaine

established that

in

marks acquired

More
stipulated t0

UCI’S subsequent trademark

“Nothing herein

in

good

faith at

importantly, as

on
the

it

“Gem

at

Rooﬁng”

business

name

continuously used the mark thereafter.

registration does not defeat

common law.”

Gem State’s

enforcement 0f rights

Idaho Code Section 48-516.

Gem State argued in its opening brief on appeal, UCI has already

Gem State’s trademark rights Via the TSA.
TSA

there

is

In response to that argument,

never an express provision that

0f ‘Gem State Rooﬁng’ as a mark,” (Respondent’s

to quote the

State

shall adversely affect the rights 0r the

any time

the perplexing argument that “In the

the validity

began using the

County, Idaho in 1997, and that

Trial Tr., p. 104, L1. 10-22.

common law rights:

it

language of the

TSA where UCI does,

UCI recognize

Brief, at 30), but then

expressly, recognize

UCI makes

UCI

goes

Gem State’s rights in

GEM STATE ROOFING word mark:
Gem State Rooﬁng Asphalt Maintenance, Inc. [UCI], agrees and
consents to Gem State Rooﬁng, Inc.’s concurrent use and
registration of the

word mark “Gem

State

Rooﬁng”

effective in

Blaine County
(see Respondent’s Brief, at 30; Tr. EXh.

from challenging
4.

1, p.

3 (emphasis added)). This is

Why UCI is

estopped

Gem State’s rights in the mark in Blaine County.
On Attorneys’

In opposing

Fees for UCI’s Discovery Abuses.

Gem State’s appeal 0f the District Court’s denial 0f attorneys’

argues that “the costs were appropriately denied because

Gem

fees,

UCI

Stateﬁled the motion before

attempting in goodfaith t0 obtain the disclosures and discovery.” Respondent’s Brief at 32. This
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is

not accurate. The District Court addressed this exact argument in the hearing 0n the Motion to

Compel:

I'm also not terribly persuaded that the motion shouldn't be

considered on the grounds that there wasn't another meet and
confer.

I

don't think that to the extent that there

confer once already that produced

some

was a meet and

additional information and

then further subpoenas and discovery that resulted in a production
of further information; I'm not sure that another meet and confer

was

actually necessary.

Transcript of March 19, 2019 hearing on Motion to Compel, p. 9, L1. 17—24.

appealed the District Court’s Order Granting the Motion t0 Compel, and

is

UCI has

not

barred from doing so

now.

UCI
that “it is

attempts to justify

its

UCI’S business practice

refusal t0 produce emails

t0 delete

emails andﬁles once ajob

are n0 longer needed.” Respondent’s Brief at 35.

unprovable

(if the

documents are unrecoverable,

deleted prior to or during the litigation)

and other documents 0n the grounds

— that

It

is

completed.

It is

also provides

it is

impossible t0

in the 2 1

St

and most other records of work as

UCI rather little

cover here: Virtually

all

of the

Gem State’s Motion t0 Compel related

animal shelter proj ect, Which was then on-going, and remains the most valuable 0f UCI’S

TSA-breaching proj ects. Thus, even

1

know whether they were

Century any business would be so

1,031 pages produced almost on the eve of the hearing 0n

t0 the

closed out because they

remains hard to believe — and, conveniently

careful, or so imprudentl, as to painstakingly delete all email

soon as a job

is

if

it

were the case

Presumably UCI would need those documents and emails for

purposes.
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that

UCI was

deleting records 0f

tax, accounting, warranty, client relations,

and other

Why did it take

completed proj ects,
shelter

a motion to compel to produce the then in-progress animal

documents?
In

effort to

its

avoid

liability

under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(2) for

admit facts that were not seriously in dispute (and were
stipulated t0 prior t0

trial),

UCI

later

admitted in deposition and

argues that “despite denials that should have been admitted, 0r

an exercise ofgoodfaith, the Courtfound against

at leastpartially admitted 0r clarified in

awarding costs because the denial did not impact the proofultimately presented at
Respondent’s Brief at 40. Tellingly,

The

District

presented at

trial,”

was

so

it is

that

the

TSA.”

Id.

unclear

UCI’S

000828. That ﬁnding

bound by

UCI

trial.”

admits that the requests “should have been admitted.”

Court never actually found that the “denial did not impact the proof ultimately

actually found

at p.

failure to

is

But

why UCI would assert the

failure t0

Court did; What the District Court

admit was justiﬁed “based 0n

perplexing: UCI’S defense strategy

that defense cannot

Admission, when the denial amounts to a

assumed business name ‘Gem

State

lie

argument

State

000080-81.

it

was not

business under the

R00ﬁng,”’ and continued

What UCI should have done

undisputable facts, and then argued their irrelevance; instead,

UCI

in Blaine

t0

is

falsely denied

d0 so despite

admitted those

What was

not justiﬁed by the belief — good faith 0r not

indisputably true. That failure t0 admit

is

TSA did not bind UCI;

issues are not even related.

two

that

be justiﬁcation for denying a Request for

R00ﬁng,”’ and had “performed rooﬁng work

R., pp.

in fact, the

“its

— 0f course UCI was “doing

County under the assumed business name ‘Gem

Gem State’s written demands.

was

defense strategy.” R.,

its

By the

— that the

District Court’s

reasoning, any defendant denying liability in any case could simply deny any request for
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admission. That, 0f course,

is

contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure and

the District Court’s error in not awarding attorneys’ fees for

5.

On UCI’s

UCI’S

is

further evidence of

failure t0 admit.

Cross-Appeal: Request for Attorneys’ Fees as the Prevailing

Party.

UCI’S argument below and 0n appeal
n0

relieﬁ

that

because the District Court awarded

UCI should be deemed the prevailingparly,

award attorneys’ fees

t0

UCI because UCI

this Court’s lead in Trilogy

its

(ii)

Network Systems,
trial

the defendant prevailed

Inc.

v.

Johnson, 172 P.3d 1119

court held that

District Court’s reliance

misplaced — in

fact,

UCI

did not

0n Trilogy
site to

in

making

Trilogy at

all in

its

(i)

the plaintiff

0n the issue of damages, and

therefore, neither side prevailed. Id. at 1122. This Court afﬁrmed. Id.

why the

UCI repeatedly

“n0 prevailing party” conclusion, the District

(Idaho 2007) (herein “Trilogy”). Like here, the Trilogy
prevailed 0n the issue 0f breach,

State

misplaced. The District Court did not

did not prevail in the underlying case:

and blatantly violated the TSA. In reaching
Court followed

is

Gem

UCI has

failed t0

show

prevailing party determination

UCI’S attorneys’ fee

(iii)

was

analysis, either in

its

brieﬁng below or on appeal.
Instead,

UCI

cites t0

Eighteen Mile Ranch,

LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving,

Ina, 117

P.3d 130 (Idaho 2005). Eighteen Mile Ranch was decided prior t0 Trilogy, so that case certainly
does not reverse Trilogy.
t0

As Eighteen Mile Ranch makes

clear, the District

Court has discretion

answer the prevailing party question by “examin[ing] and determin[ing] from an overall View,

not a claim-by—claim analysis.”
2009), 0n Which

UCI

Id., at 133.

also relies,

is

Likewise, Cramps

n0 refutation of Trilogy —
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v.

Bromley, 219 P.3d 1188 (Idaho

this

Court cited Trilogy favorably

in the

Crumps decision when

successful,

it is

this

Court concluded that “when both parties are partially

Within the court's discretion to decline an award 0f attorney fees t0 either side.

Furthermore, the fact that a party receives no afﬁrmative relief does not prohibit

deemed

the prevailing party.”

omitted).

While

monetary relief,
its

Crumps, 219 P.3d 1190

(internal citations

it

from being

and quotation marks

Gem State disagrees with the District Court’s decision t0 deny injunctive and
abundantly clear that the District Court, having so concluded, acted within

it is

discretion t0 decide that neither party prevailed

and “decline an award 0f attorney fees

t0

either side.” Id.

UCI’S appeal
related t0 the

t0

Idaho Code Section 12-1208), because “the gravamen offhe claims

Trademark Settlement Agreement” (Respondent’s Brief at 45-46)

fees does not advance

its

for an

award of

argument. Idaho Code section 12-120(3) expressly requires a ﬁnding of

a “prevailing party”: only the prevailing party gets an award 0f attorneys’ fees, and if there

is

n0

prevailing party, 12-120(3) does not apply.

UCI’s reliance on
entitled t0

its

its

offer

ofjudgment

is

similarly unavailing:

“UCI is,

at a

minimum,

post Oﬂer 0fJudgment costs andpost Oﬂer ofJudgment attorneys ’fees.”

Respondent’s Brief at 48. But Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 68 does not give
attorneys’ fees.

The

rule clearly applies only t0 “costs

.

.

.

rise t0 a right to

as allowed under Rule 54(d)(1).”

Attorneys’ fees are covered under Rule 54(6). Furthermore, an offer ofjudgment does not dictate

whether a party “prevailed”: “Although offers ofjudgment

may be

considered,

we have

cautioned that they should not be the only, 0r even most signiﬁcant, factor in the
prevailing party analysis.” Zenner

v.

Holcomb, 210 P.3d 552, 557 (Idaho 2009).
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trial

court’s

6.

UCI

On UCI’s Request for Attorneys’

Fees 0n Appeal.

should not receive an award 0f attorneys’ fees because

reasons set forth herein.

be afﬁrmed,

it

Even

if

UCI were

will remain the fact that

beneﬁt from that breach, and
Trilogy, that there

is

this

t0 prevail

it

should not prevail, for the

0n appeal and the

District Court’s decision

UCI repeatedly breached the TSA. UCI

should not

Court should endorse the District Court’s decision, based 0n

n0 prevailing

party.

III.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, and

for the reasons set forth in Appellant’s opening brief,

Gem

State respectfully requests that this Court reverse the District Court’s Judgment; order that

appropriate sanctions for discovery Violations, including attorneys’ fees and the inference

State has requested;

and pursuant

to the

Gem

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent With such sanctions
law 0f determining damages.
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